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Louisiana Supreme Court, 1939
On January 10, 1939, the Supreme Court in the case of Vin-
cent v. Bullock' handed down a landmark decision of an impor-
tance as far-reaching as that in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sal-
ling's Heirs.2 The latter case had definitely declared Louisiana's
position to be in accord with the non-ownership theory of min-
erals in place with the corollary that the right to explore was a
servitude prescribable by non-user in ten years. Since that mem-
orable decision, constant efforts have been made to find a method
of conveyancing which would, without production, tie up lands
favorable for present or future exploration and outwit the wise
policy of the state against such practice. Vincent v. Bullock, in
preserving the rights of free conveyancing set forth by our law
and at the same time continuing the prudent land policy of the
state without departing from the articles of the Code, is a schol-
arly treatise and masterful example of juridical art.
The case arose as an action in jactitation, to cancel from the
record an instrument wherein a certain mineral interest had been
sold and assigned by two of the defendants to a third defendant
on March 1, 1937. Plaintiffs alleged that this interest belonged to
them and their assignees by virtue of a reservation made by them
in a land sale on February 22, 1927. The stipulation upon which
the plaintiffs based their present ownership appeared in the fol-
lowing language:
"It is however, understood and agreed that the vendors
herein reserve unto themselves and their heirs and assigns, in
perpetuity, a one-sixteenth (1/16th) royalty of all the oil, gas
and other minerals produced and saved from said premises;
said royalty to be delivered to the vendors or assigns, free of
cost of production and a royalty of twenty-five cents per ton
for all salt and sulphur mined and marketed off said premises.
This royalty reservation forms part of the purchase price."
Defendants pleaded the prescription of ten years liberandi causa.
1. Vincent v. Bullock, (La. Sup. Ct., Docket No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939).
2. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
3. Vincent v. Bullock, quoted in opinion of Fournet, J., p. 2 (La. Sup. Ct.,
Docket No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939).
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The plaintiffs contended that the reservation made by them was
not a servitude subject to the prescription of non-user but was a
rent charge or a servitude contingent upon the event of production
or a real right dependent upon a future happening. In the final
alternative interruption of prescription was pleaded. The court
held:
(1) That the reservation was not a servitude but "a real ob-
ligation which passed with the property into the hands of the
present owner; ' 4
(2) That the real right imposed upon the land was subject to
prescription of ten years under Articles 3528, 3529, 3544, 3549,
3556 of the Civil Code. Further, that the obligation (to pay royal-
ty) was suspensive on condition that the event-production-
was to happen within the ten year limit set by law for develop-
ment of a servitude and hence was considered as broken when
that time expired under Articles 2013, 2021, 2038 of the Civil Code;
(3) That since the reservation was not a servitude, obviously
the articles controlling servitude, particularly those dealing with
obstacle, et cetera, did not apply;
(4) That the prescription was not interrupted or extended by
the acts, stipulations and acknowledgments of the defendants.
The loose use of the word "royalty" in Louisiana has resulted
in at least four popular concepts of its meaning. It is used erro-
neously as synonymous with servitude, to mean conveying or re-
serving the full right to explore for oil and gas. It is correctly
used as the equivalent of the word rent 5 to indicate the proportion
of oil and gas extracted which belongs to the lessor under a spe-
cific lease contract, and this category is further subdivided. It is
used to represent an interest sold or reserved by the owner of the
land to bear upon any lease that exists or may in the future exist,
4. Id. at 11.
5. Martel v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 114 La. 351, 38 So. 253
(1905); Houssiere Latreille Oil Co. v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 115
La. 107, 38 So. 932 (1905); Goodson v. Vivian Oil Co., 129 La. 955, 57 So. 281
(1912); Hudspeth v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 1013, 64 So. 891 (1914); Baird
v. Atlas Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920); Rowe v. Atlas Oil Co., 147 La.
37, 84 So. 485 (1920); Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924); Logan v.
State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925); Board of Commissioners of
Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1928); State v.
Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927); Board of Commissioners of
Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 821, 120 So. 380 (1929); Board of
Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46
(1931); Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931); Shell Pe-




but accompanied by a reservation to the landowner or his vendee
of the right to entirely control the leasing of the property.' It is
used to indicate the consideration paid for a servitude or lease.7
The inexact use of the word and the fact of its various connota-
tions have caused confusion in the minds of both the profession
and the laity and have also offered a fruitful ground for fraud.8
That Louisiana is not alone in confusion of the concept and lack
of exactitude in the use of the word "royalty" clearly appears
from commentators upon the practices of other jurisdictions.'
Logan v. State Gravel Co.1" may be said to have definitely
fixed the meaning of the word "royalty" in Louisiana when used
in a present or in connection with a contemplated lease. A pro-
portionate share of the working interest was held good considera-
tion for the lessor and the lease to be binding. That the "portion
is called 'royalty' instead of rent is not of the least consequence."',
This decision has been firmly adhered to and lawyers, producers
and conveyancers are clear in the meaning and legal results of the
use of the term in or regarding a lease.
The instant case in holding that in the absence of a lease, the
term indicates disposition of a real right imposed on the land
and running with it, is eminently correct and well supported by
the articles of the Code and also by the case of Callahan v. Mar-
tin 2 from California, a "qualified ownership" state."3 The present
decision is also in line with the custom and understanding of land
owners in a large area of the state. The logic is unanswerable
that royalty proceeds out of the right to lease or to explore. It
cannot be synonymous with the servitude or lease which is the
basis of its existence and upon which it depends for life. If it de-
pends upon a lease, it perishes with that contract. If it depends
upon a servitude, it dies with that grant to use. If it depends
upon full ownership of land, it depends upon title. Again, the
court's classification of the contract as being conditional, depen-
6. Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 328
(1934); Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co., 181 So. 562 (La. App. 1938).
7. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 897, 99 So. 607 (1924); Waller v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 40 F. (2d) 892 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930); Herold v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 42 F. (2d) 942 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930); Lucas v.
Baucum, 50 F. (2d) 806 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931).
8. Chatman v. Giddens, 150 La. 594, 91 So. 56 (1922); Fontenot v. Ludeau
(Docket Nos. 34, 872-3-4-5-6-7, now before La. Sup. Ct.).
9. See particularly Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties (1935)
118.
10. 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925).
11. 158 La. at 109, 103 So. at 527.
12. 3 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935).
13. Glassmire, op. cit. supra note 9, at 100.
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dent upon the suspensive element of production, logically follows.
That the rules of conditional obligation should apply is obvious.
The matter of term or life of the condition is the one of cru-
cial interest. Article 2038 cited by the court appears in the fol-
lowing language:
"When an obligation has been contracted on condition
that an event shall happen within a limited time, the condition
is considered as broken, when the time has expired without
the event having taken place. If there is no time fixed, the con-
dition may always be performed, and it is not considered as
broken, until it is become certain that the event will not
happen."
The court stated that while "the contract did not designate a time
within which the event must happen, nevertheless that time is
limited by law and 'the condition is considered as broken, when
the time (10 years) has expired without the event having taken
place.' (Brackets ours.)"14 This deduction seems to be postulated
on the theory that since a landowner selling land and reserving
mineral rights clearly retains but a servitude prescriptible in ten
years, that when he sells land and reserves royalty, he is bound
to know that this element which is dependent upon the servitude
(susceptible of reservation for only ten years) must perish with
that right. It might be argued that the royalty, being part of the
consideration of the land purchase in this deed, was in effect a
repurchase of royalty from the vendee, landowner. This would
have raised the question of the validity of the perpetuity provi-
sion and it is a matter of deep gratification to those who are op-
posed to such a result that the court closed that door on the
question raised by reservation.
The problem of term in connection with a sale of royalty
might be said to remain open. Since royalty proceeds out of the
right to explore, whether grounded upon lease or servitude, and
is limited in term by the life of those rights, it may be argued
that the landowner having inherent in his full ownership a per-
petual right of exploration, might grant royalty with unlimited
term. When that question is presented, however, the court might
well indicate that since the landowner can grant but a ten year
servitude under the law, he is also limited to that term in grant-
ing a real right having its root in a servitude regardless of wheth-
14. Vincent v. Bullock, Opinion of Fournet, J., p. 14 (La. Sup. Ct., Docket
No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939).
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er the latter right is unlimited to the landowner himself or not. It
is the hope of the writer that the court in its wisdom will see fit
to adhere to the latter line of reasoning as they did in the deci-
sion under discussion. Under the first argument lies the fear that
the excellent land policy of the state may be defeated and small
holders particularly may be unprotected and led by economic
stress to dispose forever of their most valuable possession for
relatively small sums. In the reservation question instanced by
the case under discussion, the logical application by the court of
the rules of suspensive conditional obligation avoided this dis-
aster without departure from the clear rules of civil contract and
achieved a perfect legal as well as social result.
The court held with the trial judge that the reservation was
not a rent charge as there was no "certain sum of money to be
paid annually""' in perpetuity' nor could the "reservation be
classified as calling for the delivery of 'fruits' ,,17 because oil is not
a fruit.18 Furthermore, the contract was not redeemable, 9 and
since the value of minerals in the ground is but "contemplative,
speculative and conjectural, not to say fanciful and theoretical" 20
there would be no "method of arriving at the value for redemp-
tion purposes" 2' in such a contract. In this conclusion the court
was obviously correct and again the reprobated perpetuity idea
was avoided.
The plea that the prescription had been interrupted was
grounded upon statements by the vendee to his transferee that
the reservation was contained in the original act of sale, upon a
stipulation in a subsequent donation that the gift was made "sub-
ject to the reservation,' 2 and upon a clause in a lease the purpose
of which was to insure to the lessee his full 7/8 share. This plea
15. Vincent v. Bullock, Judgment of Simon, J., p. 7 (La. Dist. Ct., 16th
Judicial Dist., Docket No. 10,806, Sept. 15, 1938); See Art. 2779, La. Civil Code
of 1870.
16. Art. 2780, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Vincent v. Bullock, Judgment of Simon, J., p. 7 (La. Dist. Ct., 16th
Judicial Dist., Docket No. 10,806, Sept. 15, 1938).
18. Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
19. Arts. 2788, 2789, 2790, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. Vincent v. Bullock, Judgment of Simon, J., p. 7 (La. Dist. Ct., 16th
Judicial Dist., Docket No. 10,806, Sept. 15, 1938) quoting from Wilkins v. Nel-
son, 155 La. 807, 813, 99 So. 607, 609 (1924).
21. Vincent v. Bullock, Judgment of Simon, J., p. 7 (La. Dist. Ct., 16th
Judicial Dist., Docket No. 10,806, Sept. 15, 1938); Arts. 2788, 2789, 2790, La.
Civil Code of 1870.
22. Vincent v. Bullock, Opinion of Fournet, J., p. 16 (La. Sup. Ct., Docket
No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939).
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was disposed of under the well accepted test 28 that a "mere ac-
knowledgment" is not enough but must be coupled with "the pur-
pose and intention of the party making the acknowledgment to
interrupt the prescription then running."24
The case of Mulhern v. Hayne25 was relied upon in urging
an extension 2 of the ten year period. In disposing of this point,
the court made the following statement:
".. . it is conceded that, in order to give a valid lease, it was
not necessary for the plaintiffs (royalty owners) to join in the
execution thereof, and, consequently, the decision in the Mul-
hem case is not applicable. '27
In holding that a right to explore is not granted by a royalty res-
ervation and indicating that consent of mere royalty owners is
not necessary to lease, great difficulty in arranging for production
may be obviated. Instances are on record in Louisiana where roy-
alty fractions of 119,317/5,000,000 and 3,340,909/11,000,000 were
sold. This might well have made leasing a practical impossibility,
had the consent of each fractional owner been held necessary.
Thus, in every aspect of the case, the court not only adhered
in logic to the legal concepts involved in the problem, but mate-
rially expedited free conveyancing in a thoroughly practical man-
ner and preserved the valuable land policy of the state.
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
23. Lewis v. Bodcaw Lumber Co., 167 La. 1067, 120 So. 859 (1929); La.
Del Oil Properties v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126 So. 684 (1930);
Arent v. Hunter, 171 La. 1059, 133 So. 157 (1931); Ventress v. Akin, 177 So. 117
(La. App. 1937); Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938); McEa-
chern v. Kinnebrew, 184 So. 601 (La. App. 1938).
24. Vincent v. Bullock, Opinion of Fournet, J., p. 15 (La. Sup. Ct., Docket
No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939) quoting from Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil
Co., Inc., 185 La. 917, 922, 171 So. 75, 77 (1936). [This was quoted with approval
in Goldsmith v. McCoy, 190 La. 320, 182 So. 519 (1938).]
25. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
26. It may be pointed out in passing that the court seemed to emphasize
the idea of extens4on rather than interruption when a joint lease is confected,
the term of'which extends beyond the original ten year period. See Coyle v.
North Central Texas Oil Co., 187 La. 238, 174 So. 274 (1937).
27. Vincent v. Bullock, Opinion of Fournet, J., p. 18 (La. Sup. Ct., Docket
No. 35,088, Jan. 10, 1939).
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